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We study a general family of quantum protocols for position verification and present a new class of
attacks based on the Clifford hierarchy. These attacks outperform current strategies based on port-
based teleportation for a large class of practical protocols. We then introduce the Interleaved Product
protocol, a new scheme for position verification involving only the preparation and measurement of
single-qubit states for which the best available attacks have a complexity exponential in the number
of classical bits transmitted.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of position-based cryptography is for an hon-
est party to use her spatio-temporal position as her only
credentials in a cryptographic protocol. In particular, Po-
sition verification aims at verifying that a certain party,
called the prover, holds a given position in space-time.
Such a protocol typically goes as follows: a set of verifiers
will coordinate and send some challenge to the prover,
and it is expected that only someone sitting in the sup-
posed position of the prover can successfully pass the
challenge.
Position verification protocols have been studied in
the classical setting where the challenges are described
by classical information, and it was shown in [1] that
information-theoretic security could never be obtained
in the standard (Vanilla) model. More precisely, it is al-
ways possible for a coalition of adversaries to convince
the verifiers, even if none of the adversaries sits in the
spatio-temporal region where the prover is supposed to
be. Note, however, that the same paper gives secure
constructions in the Bounded-Retrieval Model, which is
a variant of the Bounded-Storage Model [2]. A possi-
ble way-out of this no-go theorem would be to consider
a quantum setting. Indeed, several classical tasks which
are known to be impossible in the classical domain can
be achieved in the quantum domain: this is the case for
instance of secret key expansion [3], randomness amplifi-
cation [4] or randomness expansion [5].
Position-based cryptography in the quantum setting
was first investigated under the name of quantum tag-
ging by Kent around 2002, but only appeared in the lit-
erature much later in [6] where attacks against possible
quantum constructions are described. Malaney indepen-
dently introduced a quantum position verification scheme
in [7]. An example of a quantum protocol for position
verification is one with two verifiers: one sending a qubit
|φ〉 = U |x〉 with x ∈ {0, 1} and U some unitary, and the
second verifier sending a classical description of the uni-
tary U . The task for the prover is then to measure the
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qubit in the basis {U |0〉, U |1〉} and to return the classi-
cal value of x to both provers. There are many variations
around this protocol, and the intuition for the possible
security of such protocols is that only someone sitting in
P can obtain both U and |φ〉, perform the required mea-
surement, and return the correct value x on time. In [8],
Lau and Lo extended the attack from [6] to show that
the above intuition is incorrect if the unitary U is a Clif-
ford gate. In that case, a couple of cheaters, Alice lying
between V0 and P , and Bob lying between V1 and P , can
always fool the verifiers provided that they share a small
number of EPR pairs. This result was later generalized
by Buhrman et al. [9] who showed that such an attack
always exists provided that the coalition of cheaters share
sufficiently many EPR pairs: no position-based quantum
cryptographic protocol can display information-theoretic
security.
Two general families of attacks against such position-
verification protocols have been considered in the litera-
ture so far, both based on quantum teleportation. The
first one is inspired by Vaidman’s protocol for nonlocal
computation [10] and consists in the cheaters teleport-
ing some quantum state back and forth, with the num-
ber of exchanges depending on the success probability
of the attack. If the position-based protocol involves n
qubits, the resource (number of EPR pairs) required for
this type of attacks to succeed typically scales double-
exponentially with n [9]. Another class of attacks uses
port-based teleportation [11] and requires only exponen-
tial entanglement to succeed [12]. If one could prove that
such an attack was indeed optimal, one would obtain a
secure position-based protocol for all practical purposes.
A different class of position-based verification protocols
based on the nonlocal computation of Boolean functions
was introduced by Buhrman et al. in [13], for which they
suggested a new type of attacks based on the Garden-
hose complexity of the Boolean function. They showed in
particular that finding an explicit Boolean function with
polynomial circuit complexity (so that the honest prover
can compute it) but exponential attack complexity in the
garden-hose model is at least as difficult as separating
the classes of languages P and L, corresponding respec-
tively to decision problems decidable in polynomial time
or logarithmic space. This result was recently extended
by Klauck and Podder who showed that explicit Boolean
functions on k variables with Garden-hose complexity
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2Ω(k2+ε) will be hard to obtain [14]. These results give
us little hope of finding an explicit position-verification
based on the nonlocal computation of Boolean functions
both practical and secure.
Establishing lower bounds for the amount of entan-
glement shared by the coalition in order to successfully
attack the protocol is a non trivial task. Current lower
bounds are linear in the security parameter of the pro-
tocol [12], [15]. Recently, a tight (linear) lower bound
was proved for the BB84-based protocol where the uni-
tary U is either the identity or a Hadamard gate, in a
model where the cheaters share an initial entangled state
but are not allowed to exchange quantum communication
during the protocol [16]. It was also shown by Unruh that
security of some position-verification protocols could be
established in the quantum random oracle model, that is
if one has access to one-way functions [17].
Recently, Qi and Siopsis initiated the study of imper-
fections in quantum position-based schemes, in partic-
ular in the presence of losses in the quantum channel
between the verifiers and the prover [18]. Indeed, in or-
der to achieve practical distances between the verifiers
and the prover it is necessary for the the protocol to be
reasonably loss-tolerant.
In this paper, we investigate the family of protocols de-
scribed above, where the state |φ〉 and the unitary U is
chosen from a family of n-qubit gates. We present some
new attacks against such protocols that might become
particularly efficient when the position-verification proto-
col is practical for the honest prover. We then introduce a
new practical position-verification scheme involving only
single-qubit operations, for which the best known attacks
require an exponential amount of entanglement.
II. A GENERAL FAMILY OF
POSITION-VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS
For simplicity, we mainly focus on one-dimensional
protocols where two verifiers V0 and V1 aim at verify-
ing the position of a prover P located between them. We
note that complications occur when dealing with more
realistic 2 or 3-dimensional protocols (see for instance
[17]), but explicitly avoid these questions here. More-
over, without loss of generality, we can always assume
that the position P of the prover is exactly at equal dis-
tance to V0 and V1 and that it takes one unit of time for
light to travel from V0 (or V1) to P .
Roughly speaking, a general position-verification pro-
tocol consists of three distinct phases:
• the preparation phase, where V0 and V1 prepare a
challenge for the prover. The challenge typically
involves a quantum state (for instance an n-qubit
state, or n single-qubit states in the protocols con-
sidered in the present paper) as well as some clas-
sical information. The challenge is always given to
the prover in a distributed fashion, one part coming
from V0, the other part coming from V1.
• the execution phase, during which V0 and V1 send
their respective share of the challenge towards the
prover P , who solves the challenge she is given, and
returns her answer to the verifiers.
• the verification phase, during which the verifiers
check that (i) the answer is correct, and that (ii)
they received it not more than two time units af-
ter the beginning of the protocol. This assumes
the idealized scenario where all communications are
performed at the speed of light, and local compu-
tation take negligible time. Even in that idealized
scenario, it makes sense to allow the honest prover
to err a small fraction of the time. For this reason,
the provers accept the answer if it meets some tol-
erance threshold η. In fact, one should distinguish
between two sources of imperfections, losses and
noises, and the tolerance threshold should there-
fore specify the amount of losses (i.e. no answer
from the prover) and noise (i.e. incorrect answer)
that can be tolerated.
In this paper, we will first focus on an important fam-
ily of position verification protocols where V0 sends an
n-qubit state and V1 sends the classical description of a
measurement basis, and the prover is required to measure
the state in the correct measurement basis and to com-
municate the outcome to both verifiers. These protocols
have been widely discussed in the literature for instance
in [6] or [8]. In Section IV, we will then introduce the In-
terleaved Product protocol where the description of mea-
surement basis is transmitted to the prover as a product
of a large number of single-qubit unitaries
∏
u uivi, where
the unitaries {ui} and {vi} are respectively described to
the prover by V0 and V1. This scheme appears to be rea-
sonably new, although similar ideas, with more verifiers,
were already considered in [8]. We note that the inter-
leaved group product (i.e.
∏
uivi where the {ui} and {vi})
are described by different verifiers) has been considered
in the communication complexity literature, for instance
in a recent paper by Gowers and Viola [19].
Before defining these protocols more formally, let us
comment on some assumptions we make here. In this
paper, our main goal is to present some natural position
verification protocols and to study general classes of at-
tacks that can be carried out by coalitions of cheaters.
While we try to be as general as possible, we think it is
sensible to make some specific choices in order to sim-
plify the analysis. For instance, we restrict our protocols
to using qubit states, and more importantly, we consider
one-dimensional protocols with only 2 verifiers. Most of
our analysis would carry through to arbitrary qudit pro-
tocols involving many verifiers. We also decided to leave
aside all the problems related to timing in order to focus
on the genuinely quantum part of the procedure. This
means that we consider that all communication (classical
or quantum) is performed at the speed of light, and that
all computation is instantaneous. These are obviously
unrealistic assumptions, but dealing with more realistic
3ones can be done independently as the analysis we pro-
vide here (see for instance the work of Kent [20]). The
main source of imperfection in a position verification pro-
tocol is the quantum channel between the verifiers and
the prover, which can never be assumed to be perfect.
In general, the channel is both lossy and noisy, which is
why even an ideal prover cannot possibly pass the test
perfectly. On the other hand, it makes sense to assume
that the classical channels are essentially perfect (lossless
and noiseless).
A. Formal description of the position-verification
protocols
Following the literature, we will find it useful to de-
scribe the protocol in terms of distributed collaborative
games, where two players, named Alice and Bob, inde-
pendently receive some query from some referee, are al-
lowed a single round of (bipartite) communication and
need to output some answer. In the honest prover case,
Alice and Bob hold the same spatial position and the
prover has access to both their inputs. In the cheating
coalition case, Alice and Bob sit respectively between P
and V0 or between P and V1 and are only allowed one
simultaneous round of communication. The main result
of [9] is that if Alice and Bob can win the game with ar-
bitrarily many rounds of communication, then they can
also win it with a single simultaneous round, provided
that they are sufficiently entangled.
The main family of protocols we will consider corre-
sponding to games denoted by G(n,U , η) where n refers
to the number of qubits involved in the protocol, U is a
set of n-qubit unitaries, and η is the tolerance threshold.
We will also write G(n, k, η) when the set U is a subset
of Ck, the kth level of the Clifford hierarchy (see the ap-
pendix for a formal definition of the Clifford Hierarchy).
The protocol G(n,U , η) consists of the following phases:
Preparation Phase:
1. The verifier V0 chooses an n-qubit unitary operator
U ∈R U and an n-bit string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈R
{0, 1}n. V0 prepares |ψ〉 = U |x〉, where |x〉 =⊗n
i=1 |xi〉 is a computational basis state.
2. V0 sends x and U to V1 through some secure au-
thenticated classical channel.
Execution Phase:
1. V0 sends the n qubit quantum state |ψ〉 to prover
P at time 0. V1 sends the unitary U to P at time
τ = 0.
2. The prover P receives both |ψ〉 and U at time τ = 1.
3. After receiving |ψ〉 and U , the honest prover P com-
putes U†|ψ〉 and measures it in computational ba-
sis, obtaining some outcome string y. P then sends
back y to both V0 and V1.
Verification Phase:
1. The prover P wins the game if V0 and V1 receive
the same string y at time τ = 2, and if the Ham-
ming distance between x and y is less than ηn:
dH(x, y) ≤ ηn.
In the literature, this family is often considered in the
single qubit case, for instance with U = {id, H} where
H is the Hadamard gate [1, 9, 16]. Then it makes sense
to repeat the protocol n times in order to build some
statistics.
In our case, we aim at giving a more general picture
of the possible attacks working against this scheme and
consider n-qubit gates. For such protocols, we will show
that there exists a trade-off between the complexity of the
protocol for the honest prover and the resources needed
to break the protocol for a coalition of cheaters.
B. Attacks strategies against position verification
protocols
As was proved in [9], there always exists a working at-
tack strategy against any position verification protocol
that allows a coalition of adversaries to perfectly im-
personate the honest prover. In the case of the one-
dimensional protocols considered in this paper, such a
coalition consists without loss of generality of 2 players,
Alice (A) and Bob (B), with Alice lying on the line be-
tween V0 and P , and Bob lying between V1 and P .
The attack strategies we will consider have the follow-
ing structure:
1. Alice and Bob initially share a (possibly entangled)
initial bipartite state ρAB of dimension to be spec-
ified later. Typically, ρAB consists of many EPR
pairs.
2. Alice intercepts the communication from V0,
namely a quantum register ρC (where C stands for
challenge), as well as some classical information.
3. Bob intercepts the classical communication from
V1.
4. Depending on the classical information they re-
ceived, Alice and Bob perform respectively a quan-
tum measurement on their respective registers, AC
and B.
5. They forward all the classical information as well as
the outcomes of the measurement to their partner.
6. Finally, upon receiving this information, they pre-
pare and send their response to the verifiers.
4The main question of interest is to decide how the di-
mension of ρAB , and more particularly the entanglement
of this state, scales with the parameters of the position
verification protocol.
This scenario allows us to see the cheating procedure
as a distributed task, or game, where Alice and Bob are
asked questions (possibly consisting of a quantum state),
are allowed a single round of communication and are re-
quired to output some specific answer. They win the
game if they fool the verifiers.
We can interpret the family G(n,U , η) in these terms:
Definition 1. The distributed game G(n,U , η) is defined
as follows:
• Input: |ψ〉 = U |x〉 for Alice, U ∈ U for Bob
• Output: a ∈ {0, 1}n for Alice, b ∈ {0, 1}n for Bob
• Winning condition: a = b and dH(a, x) ≤ ηn
We now list a few questions of interest. In the perfect
setting (η = 0), how many EPR pairs do Alice and Bob
need to share to carry out a successful attack with rea-
sonable probability? One of the main open questions of
the field is to find an explicit protocol that requires an
exponential number of EPR pairs to break.
Second, if η > 0, this opens the door to new attacks,
even for non entangled cheaters. A possible strategy con-
sists in Alice measuring the state in a random basis and
forwarding her measurement outcome to Bob. Ideally, it
would be interesting to understand how the amount of
entanglement required for cheating behaves as a function
of η.
We should also comment on the definition of a success-
ful attack. If the goal is to design a secure protocol, then
Alice and Bob should not be able to cheat, even with
a very small probability. Indeed, even if the cheating
strategy only succeeds with probability 10−2 or 10−3, it
is difficult to claim that the protocol is secure. Ideally, we
want this cheating probability to be exponentially small
in n. In this paper, however, we choose for simplicity to
focus on attacks that work with high probability (close
to 1).
III. ATTACKS FOR η = 0 BASED ON THE
CLIFFORD HIERARCHY
In this section, we first study attack techniques based
on the Clifford hierarchy that can be applied by cheaters
against the family of protocols G(n,U , 0) in the case
where the value of the tolerance threshold η is set to 0.
The definition of the Clifford hierarchy is given in the ap-
pendix. Let us simply recall here that the first two levels
C1(n) and C2(n) of the hierarchy correspond respectively
to the Pauli and the Clifford groups.
In particular, we will give explicit attacks that may be
efficient in the following practically relevant cases: (1) if
U ⊆ Ck(n), that is if the unitaries all belong to some low
level k of the Clifford hierarchy, (2) if the unitaries in U
can all be implemented with a quantum circuit with a
fixed layout.
We note that these two cases correspond to protocols
that appear to be practical for a honest prover. Indeed,
gates in a low level of the Clifford Hierarchy are much
easier to implement fault tolerantly than arbitrary gates.
Moreover, if the quantum states are photonic states, and
the honest prover uses integrated photonics to implement
the unitaries in U , a fairly reasonable choice in practice,
then it makes sense to fix some layout, that is an optical
circuit consisting of single or 2-qubit gates for instance,
and to obtain the family U by changing the value of the
single and 2-qubit gates.
A. A general attack for U = Ck
Let us first define the Clifford complexity of a family
U of unitaries.
Definition 2. Let U be a set of n-qubit unitaries. We
define the Clifford complexity of the set U , denoted by
CC[U ], to be the minimum number of EPR pairs that
Alice and Bob must share to perfectly win the game
G(n,U , 0).
It is easy to see that if the unitary U is a Pauli matrix,
then Alice and Bob can win the game G(n, k = 1, 0)
without sharing any entanglement because |ψ〉 is also a
basis state |y〉. The two strings x and y coincide on the
qubits for which U is the identity or a Z Pauli matrix,
and differ for the other qubits. Therefore, Alice simply
needs to measure |ψ〉 in the computational basis and to
forward her results to Bob, who can recover the correct
string x using his knowledge of U . This shows that
CC[C1(n)] = 0.
If the unitary U belongs to the Clifford group C2, then
Alice and Bob can again win the game perfectly if they
share n EPR pairs. The idea is for Alice to teleport the
state |ψ〉 to Bob using the n EPR pairs. Bob obtains
the state σ|ψ〉 where σ ∈ C1(n) is a Pauli correction.
Applying the unitary U† to his state, Bob obtains
U†σ|ψ〉 = U†σU |x〉,
where U†σU ∈ C1(n). This means that Bob simply needs
to measure this state in the computational basis, and
forward his result to Alice. Once they know both the
value of σ and the result of the measurement, both Alice
and Bob are able to recover the correct value of the string
x and they win the game. This proves that
CC[C2(n)] ≤ n.
If the unitary U to be implemented belongs to the
kth level of the Clifford hierarchy, then Alice and Bob
can apply an iterative procedure which is described in
5Algorithm 1. This algorithm is similar to the protocol
of Vaidman [10] for instantaneously measuring nonlo-
cal variables and to the cheating strategy of [9]. The
main difference lies in the termination condition: here,
the algorithm terminates after a deterministic number of
rounds that depends on the considered level of the Clif-
ford Hierarchy.
Input: |ψ〉 = U |x〉 received by Alice, U = U0 ∈ Ck received by Bob
Output: x ∈ {0, 1}n
1 Alice teleports the state |ψ〉 to B using n EPR pairs and obtains a string describing σA1 ∈ Pn. Bob obtains
the state σA1 |ψ〉 = σA1U |x〉.
2 Bob applies U† to his state and teleports the outcome U†σA1U |x〉 to Alice, obtaining some classical
description of σB1 ∈ Pn. Alice obtains the state U1|x〉 where U1 = σB1U†σA1U ∈ Ck−1.
for j = 1 to k − 3 do
3 Alice knows the value of σA1 , . . . , σAj (among the 4jn possibilities). Alice and Bob share
4n × (n4(j−1)n)) EPR pairs devoted to Round j, corresponding to 4n sets of n× 4(j−1)n EPR pairs, one
set for each possible value of σAj . Alice teleports back each of the 4(j−1)n n-qubit states (of the form
Uj |x〉 for some unitary Uj ∈ Ck−j(n)) she received from Bob using the “teleportation channel” indexed
by σAj . In that teleportation channel, Bob obtains the state σAj+1Uj |x〉, applies U†j to that state,
before teleporting it back to Alice in the corresponding teleportation channel. Alice receives Uj+1|x〉
with Uj+1 = σBj+1U
†
jAj+1Uj ∈ Ck−(j+1).
end
4 Alice uses a final round of teleportation for the 4(k−2)n n-qubit states, and obtains a classical description of
σAk−1 .
5 Alice sends the classical value of σA1 , . . . , σAk−1 to Bob.
6 Bob applies U†k−1 to each n-qubit state, measures in the computational basis, and forwards the classical
output, as well as the value of σB1 , . . . , σAk−2 to Alice.
7 Both Alice and Bob compute the value of x.
Algorithm 1: Cheating strategy for G(n,Ck(n), 1) based on the Clifford hierarchy
Lemma 3. If Alice and Bob apply Algorithm 1, then
they win the game.
Proof. To prove the correctness of the algorithm, we need
to show that Uj ∈ Ck−j and that Bob can perform U†j
since he knows the value of Uj . The first point is shown
by recurrence: U0 = U ∈ Ck and if Uj ∈ Ck−j , then
Uj+1 = σBj+1U
†
jAj+1Uj ∈ Ck−j−1. Moreover, the value
of Uj is a function of Uj−1, σAj and σBj . For the quantum
channel labeled by σAj , Bob is therefore able to apply
U†j .
The existence of the attack strategy described in Al-
gorithm 1 allows us to obtain the following upper bound
for the Clifford complexity of the set Ck(n).
Theorem 4.
CC[Ck(n)] ≤ 4n 4n(k−2). (1)
Proof. The loop at Step 3 in Algorithm 1 can be viewed
as a branching tree with depth k − 2 (see Fig. 1). This
tree is regular with each internal node having 4n children
(corresponding to the 4n possible values for Alice’s Bell
measurement result). Each layer of the tree corresponds
to a round trip between Alice and Bob, that is 2n EPR
pairs. Computing the complexity of the attack there-
fore amounts at counting the number of branches in the
tree. For a tree of depth k − 2, the number of branches
is
∑k−3
j=0 4
jn. Moreover, the last step of the protocol con-
sists in a quantum teleportation of n × 4n(k−2) qubits
from Alice to Bob. In total, the number of EPR pairs
used in the protocols is therefore
2n
k−2∑
j=0
4jn + n4n(k−2) ≤ 4n4n(k−2).
In the following, we denote by Tree[Ck(n)] the number
of EPR pairs required to perform the attack described
by Algorithm 1 on the set of unitaries Ck(n). Theorem
4 simply says that
CC[Ck(n)] ≤ Tree[Ck(n)] ≤ 4n 4n(k−2). (2)
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4(k−2)n leaf nodes
U1|x〉
k − 1 depth U2|x〉
Uk−2|x〉
U0|x〉
Measurement outcome σA1
Measurement outcome σA2
branch corresponding to σA1
branch corresponding to σA2
Figure 1: Pictorial view of Step 3 of Algorithm 1: Each level of the tree corresponds to a round trip between Alice and Bob.
Each of the nodes correspond to a quantum state. In particular, the root node is the initial quantum state U0|x〉 received by
Alice, and the path in red dash (determined by the successive outputs of the Bell measurements) goes along the various states
held by Alice at different steps of the protocol, namely U1|x〉, . . . , Uk−2|x〉.
B. Attacks when U correspond to quantum circuits
with a fixed layout
The attack corresponding to Algorithm 1 is general
and works for any n-qubit gate in some given level of the
Clifford hierarchy. In the context of position verification
protocols, however, the interesting set of gates U from
which the unitary to be implemented is chosen, is often
more restricted. Indeed, if the protocol is to be practi-
cal, then a honest prover should be able to implement
the unitaries reasonably efficiently. For this reason, it is
interesting to consider unitaries described by quantum
circuits.
In a practical scenario, where the quantum states given
to Alice are photonic qubits, it makes sense to consider
photonic implementations for the quantum circuit, and
therefore to consider unitaries with a fixed layout for
the quantum circuit, and adjustable single and two-qubit
gates. This is typically the case for experimental imple-
mentations based on integrated photonics [21].
For this reason, the set U of unitaries considered could
be described by a fixed layout, and a specific unitary
U ∈ U is then described by giving the value of each single
or two-qubit gate in the layout. For a quantum circuit
based on linear optics, the layout L corresponds to the
position of the phase-shifters and beamsplitters, and the
unitary is given by the specific values of the phase-shifts
and transmission of the beamsplitters.
We will be interested in the complexity of attacks for
such schemes as a function of the depth and width of
such quantum circuits.
Definition 5. Let L be the layout for an n-qubit quantum
circuit, consisting of adjustable elementary gates. The set
UL of n-qubit unitaries corresponds to the set of unitaries
which can be implemented with a quantum circuit with
layout L.
Let us prove elementary results about the composition
of circuit layouts.
Lemma 6 (Parallel circuits). Let L1,L2 be two layouts
7for quantum circuits. Then
CC[UL1 ||UL2 ] ≤ CC[UL1 ] + CC[UL2 ], (3)
where L1||L2 is the layout corresponding to putting L1
and L2 in parallel.
We note that the quantum unitary corresponding to
two circuits in parallel is simply the tensor product of
the unitaries: UL1||L2 = UL1 ⊗ UL2 and therefore
UL1||L2 ⊂ UL1 ⊗ UL2 .
Proof. Consider any gate U1 ⊗ U2 ∈ UL1||L2 . Since both
Alice and Bob know the decomposition U1⊗U2, they can
implement the optimal attack for U1 and for U2 indepen-
dently, since these unitaries act on distinct sets of qubits.
The complexity of the overall attack is simply the sum
of the complexities of implementing U1 and U2, which is
upper bounded by CC[UL1 ] + CC[UL2 ].
Lemma 7 (Concatenated circuits). Let L1,L2 be two
layouts for quantum circuits. Then
CC[UL1L2 ] ≤ Tree[UL1 ]Tree[UL2 ], (4)
where L1L2 is the layout corresponding to concatenating
the layouts L1 and L2.
Proof. The strategy consists in first applying the strat-
egy corresponding to Algorithm 1 for unitary U1 ∈ UL1 .
Then, at the last round, instead of measuring the state,
Bob continues the teleportation protocol in order to im-
plement U2 ∈ UL2 . There are at most Tree[UL1 ] nodes
in the tree corresponding to the implementation of U1,
and it is sufficient to apply the protocol to each of the
leaves in order to implement to concatenation of U1 and
U2. Therefore, Tree[UL1 ]Tree[UL2 ] EPR pairs are suffi-
cient to implement the total unitary.
From Lemmas 6 and 7, it is possible to compute an
upper bound for the Clifford complexity of any layout,
as a function of its depth and size.
Theorem 8. Let L be the layout of an n-qubit quantum
circuit of depth d where each layer consists of gates in
Cki . Then
CC[UL] ≤ 4n
∑d
i=1(ki−2) × (4n)d. (5)
Proof. The layout L can be decomposed into d layers:
L = L1L2 · · · Ld. By applying Lemma 7 recursively, one
obtains that
CC[UL] ≤
d∏
i=1
Tree[ULi ].
Combining this with the result of Theorem 4, one finally
obtains
CC[UL] ≤
d∏
i=1
4n4n(ki−2),
which establishes the result.
We note that this result can be slightly improved by
using Lemma 6 together with Theorem 4 for the last
layer. Indeed, if the last layer only consists of 1 or 2-
qubit gates, then it can be implemented with at most
n× (4n)× 42(k−2) EPR pairs since the layer can be seen
as at most n parallel circuits acting on at most 2 qubits
each.
We conclude this section with an important remark,
which was already made in [18]. If the value of η is too
large, then there always exists a winning strategy for non-
entangled cheaters. For the protocols considered above,
η = 1/2 is always achievable by a simple random guessing
strategy: Alice and Bob simply agree on a random string
and return it to the verifiers. For specific protocols where
the family U displays some structure, better attacks are
available. For instance, in the case of the BB84 scheme,
measuring in the Breidbart basis allows the cheaters to
win if η ≥ 1− cos2(pi/8) ≈ 0.15.
IV. THE INTERLEAVED PRODUCT
PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce a new scheme for position
verification based on the interleaved group product. This
scheme depends on two main parameters: the number n
of single-qubit states used and a parameter t quantifying
the size of the product. More formally, the Interleaved
Product protocol denoted by GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss), goes as
follows:
Preparation Phase:
1. V0 chooses a random bit string x ∈R {0, 1}n
and and a single-qubit unitary U chosen from the
Haar measure on unitary group U(2). V0 also
chooses 2t − 1 additional independent unitaries
u1, . . . , ut, v1, . . . , vt−1 from the Haar measure on
U(2) and computes vt = u
†
tv
†
t−1 . . . v
†
1u
†
1U , thus en-
suring that U =
∏t
i=1 uivi. Verifier V0 then informs
V1 of these choices thanks to a secure classical chan-
nel.
2. V0 prepares the n-qubit state |ψ〉 = U⊗n|x〉 , ap-
plying the same unitary U to all the qubits of |x〉.
Execution Phase:
1. At time τ = 0, V0 sends the state |ψ〉 as well as the
classical description of (u1, . . . , ut) to the prover,
and V1 sends the classical description of (v1, . . . , vt)
to P .
2. At time τ = 1, the prover receives |ψ〉, computes
U =
∏t
i=1 uivi, applies (U
†)⊗n to |ψ〉 and measures
the resulting state in the computational basis, ob-
taining some outcome y ∈ {∅, 0, 1}n, which is sent
to both V0 and V1. Here the symbol ∅ refers to an
empty measurement result.
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1. The prover P wins the game if V0 and V1 both
receive an identical string y at time τ = 2, if the
number of errors is less than ηerrn and the number
of empty results ∅ is less than ηlossn.
Interestingly for this protocol, the verifiers only need
to prepare arbitrary single-qubit states and the honest
prover is simply required to measure a qubit in a given
basis, which is quite practical. We note that a similar
family of protocols was considered in [8], but with more
verifiers, which made the protocol less practical. Here we
make the choice that the same unitary U is applied to all
the qubits. A variant of the protocol would be to send
n successive challenges to the prover, with n different
choices for the unitary.
The main feature of this protocol is that the value of
the unitary U that defines the measurement basis is de-
scribed by a product U =
∏t
i=1 uivi which is communi-
cated to the prover in a distributed fashion. Intuitively,
if a coalition of cheaters tries to break the protocol, it
seems that they need to follow a back-and-forth strategy
to take care of each of the unitaries, one at the time. As
we will see in the next section, this leads to attacks with a
complexity exponential in the parameter t. On the other
hand, the honest prover simply needs to compute the 2t-
fold product of 2× 2 matrices, which takes time linear in
t.
In fact, for a practical implementation, each of the 2t
unitaries should be described with a given (finite) level
of accuracy, meaning that describing a unitary is done
with a constant number of bits. We ignore this subtlety
in the present paper.
V. ATTACK STRATEGIES FOR THE
INTERLEAVED-PRODUCT PROTOCOL
By construction, the Interleaved-Product protocol is
immune to the attacks based on the Clifford hierarchy:
this is simply because all the gates are chosen from the
Haar measure and therefore do not belong to any low
level of the Clifford hierarchy. Moreover, the product
structure enforces a large depth (of order 2t which can
be taken as arbitrarily large in practice) for the quantum
circuit. Note that in the proposal of [8], neither of these
conditions was enforced because t corresponded to the
number of verifiers (which should remain quite small for
practical protocols) and all the gates belong to some low
level of the Clifford hierarchy.
There exist, however, some attacks working in the
regime ηerr > 0, which we investigate now. Recall that
we consider here the lossless scenario where the prover
is required to give a bit value 0 or 1 for each qubit.
The first strategy uses port-based teleportation over 2t
rounds. The second strategy we will consider relies on
the Solovay-Kitaev theorem for approximating arbitrary
gates with gates in a low level of the Clifford hierar-
chy, for which the attack of Algorithm 1 can be applied.
Both attacks lead to the same complexity and require
2O(t log(t/ηerr)) EPR pairs. Both strategies work in the
lossless case ηloss = 0.
We end this section with a discussion of possible at-
tack strategies for non-entangled cheaters, which works
if ηerr + ηloss/4 ≥ 1/4.
A. Attack based on Port-based teleportation
The attack proceeds as follows:
• Alice applies the unitary u†1 to each of her n qubits
and uses m1 EPR pairs to teleport each qubit to
Bob. This consumes a total of M1 = m1n EPR
pairs.
• Bob applies the unitary v†1 to all of his qubits, and
uses m2 EPR pairs to teleport each one back to
Alice. This consumes a total of M2 = m2M1 EPR
pairs.
• This process is repeated for 2t rounds, after which
the unitary U† has been applied to all the qubits.
At each step, Alice or Bob uses mi EPR pairs to
perform the port-based teleportation of a single
qubit.
• At the last step, Bob measures each qubit in the
computational basis, and both he and Alice ex-
change their measurement results.
There are two quantities of interest to analyze the at-
tacks: the total number of EPR pairs used by Alice and
Bob, and the fidelity of the final state. Recall indeed
that port-based teleportation is not perfect, and that the
teleported state is only an approximation of the input
state.
The number M of EPR pairs is given by:
M = M1 +M2 + · · ·+M2t−1 (6)
= n
[
m1 +m1m2 + · · ·+
2t−1∏
i=1
mi
]
. (7)
The fidelity F between the qubit after the 2t− 1 rounds
of teleportation and the initial qubit is:
F ≥
2t−1∏
i=1
(
1− 4
mi
)
. (8)
Choosing the slightly suboptimal strategy where all
the mi are taken to be equal to a constant m gives: M =
nmm
2t−1−1
m−1 ≈ nm2t−1 and F = (1− 4/m)2t−1, that is:
M ≈ n
(
8t
ηerr
)2t−1
, (9)
where ηerr = 1 − F is assumed to be small. This estab-
lishes the following result.
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tack strategy against GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss = 0) that requires
n exp(O(t log(t/ηerr))) EPR pairs.
B. Attack based on the Solovay-Kitaev
approximation
We now consider a different attack strategy based
on the Solovay-Kitaev approximation, which guarantees
that any single-qubit unitary can be approximated with
accuracy ε by a sequence of unitaries taken from some
fixed universal set of gates.
Theorem 10 (Solovay-Kitaev [22]). If G ⊆ SU(d) is a
universal family of gates (where SU(d) is the group of
unitary operators in a d-dimensional Hilbert space), G
is closed under inverse and G generates a dense subset
of SU(d), then for any U ∈ SU(d), ε > 0, there exist
g1, g2, . . . , gl ∈ G such that ‖U − Ug1Ug2 . . . Ugl‖ ≤ ε and
l = O(logc
(
1
ε
)
), where c < 3 is a positive constant.
Let us fix G = {H,T} whereH is the Hadamard opera-
tor and T is the pi8 qubit gate, and note that this set lies in
the third level C3 of the Clifford hierarchy. The Solovay-
Kitaev theorem guarantees that for each unitary Ui used
in the game GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss), there exists another uni-
tary U ′i , obtained as a product of exactly l gates from
{H,T,12} (where the identity is chosen so that the size
l can be chosen to be independent the unitary Ui). By
decomposing their respective gates ui and vi into prod-
ucts of gates in C3, Alice and Bob are able to implement
the attack strategy of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 11. There exists an attack strategy for
GIP(n, t, ηerr, ηloss = 0) requiring 28t log
c(2t/ηerr)n EPR
pairs, where c < 3.
Proof. According to Solovay-Kitaev theorem, one can ap-
proximate each unitary Ui used in the protocol by an-
other unitary U ′i such that ‖Ui − U ′i‖ ≤ ηerr2t , using a
sequence of l = O(logc(2t/ηerr)) gates. Overall, the ap-
proximation quality is given by∥∥∥∥∥
t∏
i=1
UiVi −
t∏
i=1
U ′iV
′
i
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ ηerr.
The circuit to implement the gate
∏t
i=1 U
′
iV
′
i has depth
2tl and uses only gates from C2 or C3. According to The-
orem 8, the number M of EPR pairs needed to perform
the attack is
M = 28tl = 28t log
c(2t/ηerr). (10)
Performing this attack for each of the n qubits proves the
theorem.
This attack can in fact be improved by noting that the
gates in G = {H,T} are semi-Clifford (see the appendix
for a definition). Recall that for a semi-Clifford unitary
U , there are 2n operators σ ∈ Pn such that UσU† ∈ Pn.
This implies that for such gates, the tree described in
Algorithm 1 can be taken to have degree 4n−2n. For n =
1, as is the case here, this means that the complexity of
approximating
∏t
i=1 UiVi can be reduced to 2
4lt instead
of 28lt, leading to an overall quadratic improvement in
the complexity of the attack.
C. Attacks for a non-entangled coalition of cheaters
A possible cheating strategy for non-entangled cheaters
was considered in [18] and goes as follows: Alice mea-
sures each qubit |ψi〉 of the incoming state in a random
basis, obtains some measurement result corresponding to
a qubit state |ψ˜i〉 and communicates the classical descrip-
tion of ψ˜i to Bob. When Alice and Bob learn the value of
the unitary U =
∏t
i=1 uivi, they can simply consider the
state U†|ψ˜i〉 and output 0 or 1, depending on whether
U†|ψ˜i〉 is closer to |0〉 or to |1〉. This strategy gives them
the correct bit with probability 3/4. Overall, this strat-
egy leads to an expected fraction of correct bits equal
to 3/4, which means that the protocol GIP(n, t, 1/4, 0) is
not secure against non entangled cheaters.
If ηloss > 0, that is if losses are tolerated, then Alice
and Bob can apply the same technique and return a value
only if max{|〈0|U†|ψ˜i〉|2, |〈0|U†|ψ˜i〉|2} is large enough. A
similar analysis as in [18] shows that if Alice and Bob
only return a value for a fraction 1− ηloss of the qubits,
then their error rate is (1 − ηloss)/4. This shows that
non entangled cheaters have a winning strategy as soon
as ηerr + ηloss/4 ≥ 1/4.
We leave as an open question whether there exist
subexponential strategies allowing the cheaters to win the
game with non negligible probability when ηerr+ηloss/4 ≤
1/4− ε for some small ε > 0.
VI. LOSS-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS
In general, the strategies consisting in measuring the
state in a random basis allow the cheaters to win a con-
stant fraction of the n “rounds” of a game. This is prob-
lematic because it seems that a honest prover cannot do
much better as soon as the quantum channel from the
verifiers is imperfect, either lossy or noisy. As a conse-
quence, it would appear that position verification is not
robust against losses or noise (see [18] for possible trade-
offs between loss and noise). Fortunately, this conclusion
is a little bit too pessimistic.
For instance, the Interleaved Product protocol can be
straightforwardly modified to be made loss-tolerant, pro-
vided that the prover has access to a good quantum mem-
ory. The crucial point to note here is that this protocol
appears to remain secure even if the quantum state is
distributed in advance compared to the classical infor-
mation required to decide in which basis to measure the
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state or to which verifier it should be forwarded. From
this observation, we propose the following modification
of the Interleaved Product protocol:
In addition to the verifiers, there is a central “bank” of
quantum states available to the prover. This bank (whose
role can be played by the verifiers) distributes quantum
states, along with some identification number, to inter-
ested parties. The value of the states is not revealed to the
client but the verifiers have access to a complete listing
of pairs: (state ID, state value). When a prover wants
to authenticate her position thanks to a position verifica-
tion protocol, she should therefore obtain a quantum state
from the bank, put it in a quantum memory, and then
inform the verifiers of the state ID. Then, the verifiers
can apply the usual protocol, with the exception that the
state |ψ〉 does not need to be distributed since the game is
played with the state the prover obtained from the bank.
It seems to us that this modified protocol remains
as secure as the original Interleaved Product protocol.
More precisely, we could not think of any attack working
against the modified version that would not also work
against the original version.
The advantage of this modified version is that the
quantum channel between the verifiers and the prover
is replaced by the quantum memory of the prover. This
could become quite advantageous in a scenario where the
physical distance between the verifiers and the prover is
large, meaning that fiber optics communication would
lead to high losses, provided that the prover has access
to a good quantum memory. While the current state-of-
the-art on quantum memories (see for instance [23] for
a recent review) is certainly not sufficient to implement
this modified version of the protocol, there are no reason
to doubt that high fidelity quantum memories with long
coherence time will not become available in the future.
VII. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper we have first studied a general family of
attack strategies against position based quantum cryp-
tography. In particular, we have established a connec-
tion between several well studied quantum information
processing tasks and position based quantum cryptog-
raphy. It was previously known that there exists some
efficient attack when the verifiers choose the challenge
unitary from Clifford group. Here, we showed that this
remains true if the unitaries lie in a low level of the Clif-
ford hierarchy. This result connects notions relevant in
fault-tolerant quantum computing with the attack com-
plexity of position based quantum cryptography.
Then, we have introduced a very practical position-
verification scheme, the Interleaved Product protocol,
which appears to be immune to these attacks and dis-
plays the further advantage of being loss-tolerant in a
scenario where the quantum state is distributed indepen-
dently from the classical challenge.
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Appendix A: Technical tools
In this appendix, we review some technical notion used
in the rest of the paper: the Clifford Hierarchy, telepor-
tation gates, semi-Clifford gates and port-based telepor-
tation.
1. The Clifford Hierarchy
The Clifford Hierarchy introduced in [25] is an infi-
nite hierarchy of sets C1(n) ⊂ C2(n) ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ck(n) · · ·
of n-qubit unitaries where C1(n) = Pn corresponds to
the Pauli group (on n qubits), and the higher levels are
defined recursively by:
U ∈ Ck+1(n) if and only if UσU† ∈ Ck(n) for all σ ∈ C1(n).
When n is clear from context, we simply write Ck instead
of Ck(n) for the kth level of the Clifford hierarchy for n-
qubit gates. It should be noted that the first two levels
of the hierarchy are groups, namely the Pauli and the
Clifford groups, whereas none of the higher levels are
groups.
The gates from C1 and C2 can be “easily” implemented
fault tolerantly [26]. However, it is well known that they
do not form a universal set for quantum computation.
One therefore requires at least one gate from C3 to obtain
a universal set of gates. Not surprisingly, gates from C3
or higher levels are usually much harder to implement
fault-tolerantly.
2. Teleportation Gates
Teleportation gates are a tool introduced by Gottes-
man and Chuang [25] to implement a unitary operator
U on any state provided that one can apply it to a spe-
cial state. In particular, teleportation and the ability
to perform single qubit operators are sufficient to obtain
(fault-tolerant) universal quantum computation.
The main idea relies on the fact that if one uses the
state (I ⊗ U)|Φ+〉 instead of |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) to
teleport a quantum state |ψ〉 then the teleported state
will be of the form U |ψ〉 (up to some Pauli correction).
To implement an n-qubit quantum gate U ∈ C3, one
first prepares the state |ΨnU 〉 = (I ⊗ U)|Φ+〉⊗n. Let |ψ〉
be an unknown state on which U has to be applied. Then
taking |ψ〉 and performing a Bell basis measurement on
|ψ〉 and on the first register of |ΨnU 〉 leaves n qubits in the
state |ψout〉 = UR|ψ〉 = R1U |ψ〉, where the correction
R ∈ C1 is a Pauli operator and R1 = URU† ∈ C2. Since
R1 ∈ C2, its inverse can easily be implemented, thus
giving the state U |ψ〉. Hence, using only n EPR pairs,
one can implement any n-qubit quantum gate from C3
provided that the state |ΨnU 〉 can be prepared efficiently.
If U belongs to some higher level Ck with k > 3 of
the Clifford hierarchy, then one can apply the technique
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outlined above iteratively for k − 2 steps. Indeed, in
that case, the correction R1 belongs to Ck−1. It should
be clear that higher levels of the hierarchy require more
teleportation steps and Bell measurements.
3. Semi-Clifford Gates
Semi-Clifford gates are another special type of gates
with different structural properties than the gates in Clif-
ford hierarchy. The concept of semi-Clifford gates was
first introduced for the single-qubit case by D. Gross and
M. Van den Nest in [27], and generalized to n-qubit states
by Zeng et al in [28].
Definition 12. An n-qubit unitary operation is called
semi-Clifford if it sends by conjugation at least one max-
imal abelian subgroup of Pn to another maximal abelian
subgroup of Pn.
In particular, if U is an n-qubit semi-Clifford opera-
tion, then there must exist at least one maximal abelian
subgroup G of Pn, such that UGU† is another maximal
abelian subgroup of Pn. While the general structure of
the semi-Clifford gates is not yet completely understood
for arbitrary n, we have a characterization for n = 1, 2
and a partial characterization for n = 3.
Theorem 13 (from [28]). The gates in Ck(1), Ck(2) are
semi-Clifford for all k. For n = 3, all the gates in C3(3)
are semi-Clifford.
In our work, semi-Clifford gates will be of interest as
they allow the cheaters to perform more efficient attack
strategies for the second family of protocols.
4. Port-based teleportation
Port-based teleportation is a specific teleportation
scheme introduced in [11], that allows Alice to teleport
an arbitrary quantum state to Bob, using many EPR
pairs, called ports. After Alice’s measurement on her
state and her half of the EPR pairs, the state is tele-
ported (approximately) to one of Bob’s port, known to
Alice. Alice simply sends this classical information to
Bob, who only needs to trace out the other ports to re-
cover Alice’s state. The main feature of this teleporta-
tion scheme is that apart from tracing out some registers,
Bob needs not apply any correction to the state. The fi-
delity Fp(|Ψin〉, |Ψout〉) between Alice’s initial state and
Bob’s final state using port-based teleportation depends
on both the number N of EPR pairs consumed in the
scheme and the dimension d of Alice’s state. The follow-
ing lower-bound was established in [29].
Lemma 14 (from [29]).
Fp(|Ψin〉, |Ψout〉) ≥ 1− d
2
N
. (A1)
